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Abstract
Objectives: Some women choose to give birth outside medical protocol or ignore medical advice. This could be
perceived as a maternal-fetal conflict. Many professionals are unsure about the legal possibilities and ethical
intricacies in these circumstances, and the position of the fetus. This paper attempts to elucidate and provide a
framework for these issues.
Methods: We did a literature search on Pubmed in October 2014, using the terms “legal/law”, “pregnant/
pregnancy”, “legal measures”, “court-ordered caesarean/cesarean”, “birth”, “childbirth” and “homebirth”. We also
reviewed some professional organisations’ guidelines.
Results: Much has been written about legal restrictions and measures against women who go against medical
advice, for instance court-ordered cesarean sections or forced hospital admissions. Medical professionals fear
litigation in case of a bad outcome when the mother’s wishes are respected. However, medical assessment of risk
and benefit is sometimes inaccurate. Maternal competence is a central issue.
The pregnant patient has the right to autonomy, bodily integrity, freedom and self-determination and the fetus has
the right to have its life protected. However, it is unethical to invade one person’s physical integrity for the benefit of
another, especially if the other is not born yet. Religious rights are generally respected, but this is not unlimited.
International guidelines on this subject generally state that a competent pregnant patient has the same rights as
any other person and that her autonomy should prevail.
Conclusions: In contrast to the general perception the conflict described is not between mother and child but
between doctor and patient. Communication can be the key to solving this problem. In cases of continued
disagreement, the mother’s autonomy should prevail.
Significance: In this era of social media and access to information for all, patients are better informed than ever
before. At the same time, shared decision making is rapidly becoming the norm. Obstetrical care providers are
increasingly faced with pregnant patients who refuse some or all proposed interventions. These decisions may
appear to be at odds with what medical professionals deem best for the fetus. We have attempted to provide a legal
and ethical framework for looking at this dilemma.
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Introduction
Evidence based guidelines can help healthcare practitioners to
provide better and more cost effective care for the average patient with
a specific medical problem [1]. During the past 15 years, the Cochrane
Collaboration, NICE, and many other national and international
organizations have provided obstetric medicine with a wealth of new
evidence based guidelines. However, more protocolized care also
means less room for personalized medicine. Not all patients have the
same perception of risk as medical staff [2] and some attach more
importance to avoiding a certain intervention (for instance caesarean
section) than to incurring a small increase in risk of perinatal
morbidity or mortality. One of the consequences of the plethora of
protocols in obstetric medicine could be a real or perceived increase in
the number of patients who wish to go outside the standard of care. No
quantitative surveys on this subject have been done to date, so exact
numbers are not available. Much is still unclear among professionals
about the rights of a pregnant woman, those of her fetus, and the legal
position of a healthcare provider who is willing to assist a woman who
wants to give birth outside the standard protocol. The debate is as yet
unresolved whether the law can or indeed should intervene in
situations where the woman’s decision seems to put the fetus’s life at
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risk. This is often described by obstetricians as a maternal-fetal
conflict. In this paper we will provide some insight into the legal and
ethical context surrounding women’s rights in childbirth and the issues
mentioned above. We will also review some professional organizations’
statements on these issues. Legal measures against pregnant women in
literature.
For the purposes of this paper, we were interested in the legal
position of women who desire to give birth outside the current medical
protocols. This constitutes giving birth at home against medical advice,
or giving birth unattended by any medical professional (free birth or
unattended childbirth). We did a literature search on Pubmed in
October 2014, using the terms “legal/law”, “pregnant/pregnancy”, “legal
measures”, “court-ordered caesarean/caesarean”, “birth”, “childbirth”
and “homebirth”. We found many publications detailing how women’s
choices in pregnancy and childbirth have been restricted and punished
by both criminal and civil law. A full review of this issue was written by
Cherry [3] and provided many of the examples used below. Much of
this literature originates in the United States and concerns civil law. In
the 1980’s and 90’s a substantial number of papers were written about
court-ordered caesareans (COC). The first reported case occurred in
1981, and concerned a patient with complete placenta previa [4]. She
refused caesarean section on religious grounds and a court order was
obtained to enforce the procedure, citing a state interest in the welfare
of the term fetus. However, before the section could be performed she
went into labour and delivered vaginally without major problems.
Another well-known case is the one of Laura Pemberton, a Florida
woman who attempted a home birth after a previous caesarean section.
Her doctors judged that she needed a repeat caesarean and obtained a
court order from a judge to have her forcibly removed from her home.
She underwent a caesarean section under protest and subsequently had
three more vaginal deliveries [5]. Cherry reports a case of a woman
being arrested for fear of her giving birth unattended by a health care
professional [5]. In 1987, Kolder et al. [6] published the first review of
known COC cases. They also included one case of forced blood
transfusion to a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness. Notably, a large
proportion of the patients who had legal action taken against them for
non-compliance with doctors’ recommendations was poor, black,
unmarried and on welfare.
It is notoriously difficult for medical professionals to accurately
predict fetal outcome. Annas, in 1982, described two cases of COC in
the United States. The first case involved another woman with placenta
previa who was judged by her doctors as having 99% chance of fetal
death in case of a vaginal delivery. A COC was ordered, but in the
mean time she delivered vaginally and had a healthy child. In the
second case the attending obstetrician diagnosed fetal distress. The
COC was performed nine hours later and the child was born in good
condition [7]. Recently, a Florida court compelled a pregnant woman
to undergo a cesarean section against her wishes after premature
rupture of membranes at 25 weeks. She had wanted to go home and get
a second opinion but her physician sought and obtained a court order.
The COC was performed three days later and resulted in a stillbirth
[8]. In contrast, Elkins reported two cases in 1989, one of which was an
unwanted pregnancy where a COC was sought for fetal distress. It was
denied and an intra-partum fetal death occurred. In the other case, the
pregnant woman was diagnosed with severe depression. A COC was
performed for fetal distress and the baby was born alive but acidotic.
Both of these women were in the hospital for the first time and had not
had any chance of discussing their wishes prior to the described
emergency [9].
Many other interventions and measures against pregnant women
have been reported in criminal law literature. In the United States,
some states can give the court jurisdiction over unborn children when
the mother habitually uses drugs or alcohol [5,10]. This means that
pregnant women can be taken into custody and sentenced to prison for
child endangerment when they use illicit substances. This has led to 12
states requiring physicians to report drug use in pregnancy to child
welfare agencies [3]. We have been unable to find any reference to
action being taken against a pregnant woman for smoking cigarettes or
being overweight, even though these are also well established risk
factors for a number of unfavourable outcomes. However, documented
cases include women being arrested for exposing their unborn child to
dangerous fumes, for not following doctors’ orders to take bed rest,
and for taking a long time to get to the hospital while in labour or
while bleeding [1,5]. Cherry [3] describes a case where a judge
sentenced a pregnant woman to prison for credit card fraud to prevent
her from having the opportunity to obtain the abortion she announced
she wanted. By 1999, more than 200 US women were on record for
having been arrested for endangering fetal health.
Legal measures have also been taken after the fact: several mothers
have been charged with murder after refusing a caesarean section
deemed necessary to save the life of their child [11-14]. Bowes, in 1981,
cited jurisprudence where “the fetus may be the victim of homicide if
born alive but dies as a result of prenatal injury [15]. And even if the
child survives, it can later sue it’s mother in civic court for actions
taken by her that may have adversely affected the child’s development
prior to birth [11]. This paves the way for any number of legal issues
surrounding choices pregnant women, or indeed parents, make
regarding their (unborn) children. Although less has been published
on this subject in recent years, court-ordered caesarean sections are by
no means a thing of the past. Margolin described a case in 2014 in
Israel where medical staff was given carte blanche by the court to
perform any examination or intervention deemed necessary in order
to prevent damages to the fetus and the patient herself [16]. In a survey
performed among the heads of maternal-fetal medicine fellowships in
the United States in 1987, many thought that pregnant women who
endangered their fetus’s life should be detained and that forced
treatment under those circumstances was acceptable [6]. Adams in
2003 and Samuels in 2007 did similar surveys and found that, although
the willingness to go against patient’s wishes by taking legal action had
significantly decreased, still every interviewee could envision
conditions under which they would ultimately take such a step [13,17].
In the matter of legal involvement with women’s decisions in
pregnancy, competence is a central issue. When unconscious, a patient
is incompetent. In that case, consent can be assumed for interventions
deemed necessary to prevent death or serious harm to the patient.
Competence can also be in question in cases of severe mental illness or
a state of drug-induced decreased mental capacity [18,19] although
this does not necessarily imply that a patient with any psychiatric
problem is automatically legally incompetent. In addition, the vast
majority of pregnant women, regardless of whether or not they agree
with the treatment their physician suggests, are legally competent.
However, some physicians find it difficult to imagine how a person of
sound mind could possibly disagree with the proposed plan of
treatment. Cahill wrote about this in 1999: “There seems to be a
blanket assumption of maternal incompetence: women who refuse
recommended treatment cannot be of sound mind [20]. But, as Cherry
[3] states: “the making of poor choices does not generally constitute
mental disease or defect”.
Citation: Hollander M, Dillen JV, Janssen TL, Leeuwen EV, Duijst W, et al. (2016) Women Refusing Standard Obstetric Care: Maternal Fetal
Conflict or Doctor-patient Conflict?. J Preg Child Health 3: 251. doi:10.4172/2376-127X.1000251
Page 2 of 5
J Preg Child Health
ISSN:2376-127X JPCH, an open access journal Volume 3 • Issue 2 • 1000251
In this era of malpractice lawsuits, physicians are, understandably,
afraid when patients make choices that, in the opinion of the doctor,
may increase the chance of harm to the fetus. However, we have found
no reported cases in the literature where a health care professional was
found guilty of negligence by a court for respecting a competent
patient’s wishes [21]. Therefore these fears appear to be unfounded. On
the other hand, overruling the patient may leave the treating physician
open to allegations of assault and battery [22]. Legal concerns have led
doctors to be guided by fear and to practice defensive medicine [23].
Many daily obstetrical decisions are made based on risks, without
knowing exactly how high those risks are. Medicine itself seems to be
moving more and more towards a risk based, preventative approach,
where pathology is defined by a standard deviation of the norm. A
recent survey done among young (mostly female) obstetricians in
Canada showed that they, compared to their older, predominantly
male predecessors, were more likely to favor technology during birth
in order to maintain control, and were less appreciative of the role of
women in their own birth [24].
Ethical Considerations: Do the Rights of the Mother
Conflict with those of the Child?
Informed consent and shared decision making are important
principles of current medical practice. Health care professionals outline
the different treatment options with the accompanying risks and
benefits, and the patient decides. Although the patient may make
another decision than the doctor would make, this has not led to
doctors forcing patients to undergo surgery or a medical therapy that
the patient does not wish, even if it leads to the untimely demise of the
patient. Obstetrics is different and unique in the sense that many
health care professionals feel that there are two patients involved:
mother and fetus, and doctors feel they are equally responsible for
both. If the mother makes a decision that the professional feels may put
her child at risk, it may be emotionally difficult to accept this. In the
greater part of the twentieth century, the aim of prenatal care in the
developed world was reducing maternal mortality. In recent decades,
with the arrival of ultrasound and fetal monitoring, the fetus has
become much more visible during pregnancy and has now become the
main focus of prenatal care. Pregnant patients are offered genetic
counseling, fetal aneuploidy screening and ultrasounds for structural
defects. It seems natural that, with increasing visibility of the fetus,
more importance is being attached to its rights and wellbeing. In
weighing the wishes of the mother against fetal interests, numbers
needed to treat and numbers needed to harm play a role, as well as the
valuation of the different outcomes. It is a well-known fact that
medical professionals frequently disagree amongst each other in the
estimation of risks and benefits, and also in their advice [6]. If a
decision that a pregnant woman makes with regard to her pregnancy
increases the chances of fetal harm by a certain margin that is not the
same as saying that the fetus will certainly come to harm.
Autonomy, bodily integrity, freedom and self-determination are
important principles in modern society. Pregnant women should be no
exception. However, freedom and self-determination are not absolute.
They can be curtailed if necessary to prevent harm to others, for
instance in the case of mandatory isolation during an outbreak of an
infectious disease [25]. With growing medical knowledge of the fetal
condition in utero there are more arguments being made for fetal
rights [26]. The question then becomes: is the fetus an “other” in the
eyes of the law [22]? This leads directly to the debate on personhood.
What constitutes a person? The law in many countries states that one
has to be born to be a person. However, the case for personhood for
the fetus is, counter-intuitively, largely grounded in abortion law. If
abortion is illegal after viability is attained, does this not automatically
mean that the fetus at that point gains certain rights to have its life
protected? And if a woman does not choose abortion, has she de facto
accepted that the fetus is a person and even subordinated her personal
rights to the fetus’s right to life? This is described by Draper [27] as a
slippery slope: we do defend the rights of the fetus in the respect that
we can’t end its life any time the mother wants, but as long as it is not
born, the mother’s wish prevails.
Next we should look at forced interventions on pregnant women for
the benefit of their fetus. In order to protect one from harm, we would
have to do harm to the other. The question is: is it ethical to inflict
harm on one person against their will to prevent harm to another?
Some have attempted to answer this question by comparing the
maternal fetal “conflict” to that of one person being forced to donate
an organ for the benefit of another (the US legal case of McFall vs
Shimp). This reasoning has never been approved by a court, not even
in the case of a deceased person who during life had chosen not to
become an organ donor after death. Do we then award pregnant
women fewer rights than deceased people or fetuses more rights than
people who have already been born? Of course, this comparison is
unfair to the extent that, in most cases, the harm to the mother would
be temporary and would not leave any lasting physical scars, with the
exception of a forced caesarean section. However, if we would, under
certain circumstances, be willing to take away the mother’s autonomy
for the benefit of her fetus, where would that lead us? Forced bed rest
for threatening preterm labour? Mandatory cessation of smoking in
pregnancy, punishable by fines or incarceration?
Some women have claimed religion as a reason for refusing to
follow medical advice [4]. Although freedom of religion is an
important right in modern society, religious rights have also been the
focus of much social debate. For instance, male circumcision is widely
accepted in many western countries as either a cultural or religious
requirement, whereas female genital mutilation, for those same
reasons, has generally been outlawed, even in countries where it is
widely practiced. Therefore, there are limits to freedom of religion,
where it concerns decisions parents make for their children. Whether
or not a child is actually born can be a deciding factor. For instance, a
Jehovah’s Witness can refuse a blood transfusion for herself, even when
she is pregnant. However, once her child is born and needs a blood
transfusion to survive, a court may relieve the parents of their parental
rights in order to be able to override their refusal. If, for example, a 36
weeks pregnant rhesus negative woman with decreased fetal
movements comes to the hospital and ultrasound reveals severe fetal
anaemia, she may refuse an intrauterine transfusion, based on religious
reasons. But how would we value her decision if, after consultation
with her religious leaders, she also refuses induction of labour in order
for a paediatrician to perform a neonatal transfusion?
Guidelines by Professional Organizations Regarding
the Issue of Maternal-fetal Conflict
Many professional organizations have created guidelines on how to
handle situations of perceived maternal-fetal conflict. The American
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists states: “Pregnant
women’s autonomous decisions should be respected. Concerns about
the impact of maternal decisions on fetal well-being should be
discussed in the context of medical evidence and understood within
the context of each woman’s broad social network, cultural beliefs, and
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values. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, circumstances
that, in fact, the Committee on Ethics cannot currently imagine,
judicial authority should not be used to implement treatment regimens
aimed at protecting the fetus, for such actions violate the pregnant
woman’s autonomy” [28]. The Australian Medical Association says: “A
pregnant woman has the same rights to privacy, to bodily integrity, and
to make her own informed, autonomous health care decisions as any
competent individual, consistent with the legal framework of that
jurisdiction. A pregnant woman’s capacity to make an informed
decision should not be confused with whether or not the doctor
(medical practitioner) considers her decision to be reasonable, sensible
or advisable. A doctor may not treat a competent pregnant woman
who has refused consent to treatment. Recourse to the law to impose
medical advice or treatment on a competent pregnant woman is
inappropriate [29]. In addition, the American Academy of Pediatrics
counsels that “court intervention should be sought only in rare cases
and should be seen as a last resort to be undertaken with great caution
[30]. The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists in the
United Kingdom finds that: “It is inappropriate and unlikely to be
helpful or necessary to invoke judicial intervention to overrule an
informed and competent woman’s refusal of a proposed medical
treatment, even though her refusal might place her life and that of her
fetus at risk” [31]. Recently, the World Health Organization released a
statement on “The prevention and elimination of disrespect and abuse
during facility-based childbirth [32].
Conclusion
Medical professionals working in obstetrics often feel as if there are
not one but two patients to consider: the pregnant woman and her
unborn child. In recent years, the way in which medicine is practiced
has changed, due to increased evidence and protocols. Where the
medical professional trusts in the protocol, some patients may feel
more comfortable putting their faith in their own body’s ability to give
birth without (a certain amount of) medical intervention. As shown in
the examples mentioned in this paper, professionals frequently
disagree on the preferred course of action and are sometimes incorrect
in their estimation of fetal danger. In some cases this may lead to a
situation where doctor and patient disagree on the treatment plan. If
the patient opts for a course that could lead to a perceived increase in
risk for the fetus, the doctor may feel that there is a conflict between
mother and fetus, where in reality it is the doctor and the patient who
are at odds. The best solution to this problem is not to be found in legal
action taken against the mother, but in communication between
doctor and patient. Counseling patients with respect for their
individual circumstances, background, opinions and convictions, and
being open and honest about risks, benefits, and uncertainty, will in
most cases be sufficient to resolve the problem. In some select cases, an
agreement cannot be reached. In those cases, it may be advisable to
discuss the patient’s wishes in a multidisciplinary setting. Panelists
could be obstetricians, midwives, nurses, legal and ethical experts and
social workers, and even the patient herself. The aim of such a
discussion is to attempt to reach a compromise with which both
patient and medical staff feel comfortable. If a compromise cannot be
reached, the autonomy of the patient, according to professional
guidelines, should prevail.
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